Hofstadter DOES argue at length that in order to most truly talk about a dog, you have to see & talk about the scale of the dog - and that our human selves and human categories are as real as they could be.
And yet some of the phrases in the book still suggest a *primacy* of the more granular, material, mechanical scales, and that a unified theory of physics COULD in some way 'describe everything most accurately'...
Given the analogies Hofstadter sets up - IS there an equivalent of the Gödel incompleteness theorem within physics/the physical universe?
00:00 i am a strange loop
02:48 could one describe a dog in terms of its physics?
07:15 would an infinite being prefer the scale of physics?
12:02 ARE smaller phenomena always more able to be described with hard science?
14:27 could what happened to principia mathematica happen to physics?
18:13 self-referential loops appear in a formal system of sufficient complexity, THEREFORE making it true but incomplete RIGHT? right??