Here I argue we have free will by presenting my own, event-causal libertarian theory of free will, and by critiquing the argument used by Alex O'Connor and others to say we don't have it.
To make my case I must discuss related topics like causation, natural laws, determinism and how to analyse 'could have done otherwise' claims.
#freewill #alexoconnor #cosmicskeptic
For more ways to connect with me you can:
Book philosophy sessions with me (limited spaces) via email: drnathanhawkins _AT_ gmail _dot_ com.
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____Video Contents____
00:00 - Introduction
01:02 - Defining free will
02:48 - Alex O'Connor's definition of free will
04:33 - Alex O'Connor's 'wants' argument against free will
06:50 - Intellectual deliberation criticism
09:55 - Alternative motivation criticism
14:37 - My free will theory
18:33 - Alex O'Connor's causal determinism argument
20:43 - Determinism and physics (causal and mathematical)
27:03 - Determinism, natural laws, and 'could have done otherwise'
35:44 - Peter van Inwagen's determinism argument against free will (by O'Connor)
39:20 - Peter van Inwagen's determinism argument critiqued
47:38 - O'Connor's argument against Ben Shapiro
50:03 - My critique/view vs Ben Shapiro's
53:19 - How free will makes causation intelligible
____References and links (in order)____
Philosopher's survey:
Bourget, David & Chalmers, David J. (2023). Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey. Philosophers' Imprint 23 (11).
O'Connor's videos on free will:
https://youtu.be/OwaXqep-bpk?si=Ig-hwjzOtGA8_KN5
https://youtu.be/Dqj32jxOC0Y?si=FziIjOaAyofcpxRO
https://youtu.be/7sHZS2rZyJM?si=HMut67DWvHOGbQLN
Free will technical accounts:
Kane, Robert (1989). Two kinds of incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):219-54.
Davidson, Donald (1969). How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral concepts. London,: Oxford University Press.
Causation in Physics:
Russell, B. (1912). On the notion of cause. Scientia 7 (13):317.
Determinism's epistemic paradox:
https://youtu.be/iSfXdNIolQA?si=141ZirmWA4lE1-DW
Developmental psychology article:
Kushnir, Tamar ; Gopnik, Alison ; Chernyak, Nadia ; Seiver, Elizabeth & Wellman, Henry M. (2015). Developing intuitions about free will between ages four and six. Cognition 138 (C):79-101.
Peter van Inwagen's argument:
Inwagen, Peter Van (1975). The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.
VSauce video on kinds of infinities:
https://youtu.be/SrU9YDoXE88?si=8PWeyqgLItpvbxcS
Multiple realisability and free will:
List, Christian (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
____Channel description____
I am a graduate of Cambridge University with a PhD in Philosophy. My thesis was on the nature of truth, and I specialise in metaphysics, logic, and the history of analytic philosophy. I believe philosophy should be made accessible to the curious and philosophers have a duty to reenter the public debate on the questions of importance to our age. This channel is my attempt to do that!
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____Lessons____
I supervise Cambridge students and have some private students too. If you'd like to learn philosophy casually or on a course, then get in touch and I can help guide you through your learning. Get in touch to find out more: drnathanhawkins _AT_ gmail _dot_ com